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I. BACKGROUND

On April 30, 1970, President Nixon announced that American and South
Vietnamese forces were moving against enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia.'
Student protests ensued and on May 4, 1970, Ohio Guardsmen fired tear gas2
and weapons into a crowd of students at Kent State University in Ohio.
Four students were killed; nine wounded. 3
On May 14, 1970, city and state police were called to Jackson State
University in Mississippi after disturbances arose. 4 The police opened fire
killing two black students and wounding twelve. 5
By the end of that May, nearly one third of the 2500 colleges and
universities in America had experienced some kind of protest activity.6
On May 18, 1970, Matt Byrne resigned as U.S. Attorney of the Central
District of California.7
A 1967 Lyndon Johnson appointee, he was
nominated by Johnson for a federal judgeship in 1968, only to have his

*

John Van de Kamp served as the District Attorney for the County of Los Angeles from 1975

until 1983, and then as the 28th Attorney General of California from 1983 until 1991.
1. President Richard Nixon, Speech on Cambodia (Apr. 30, 1979),
http://vietnam.vassar.edu/doc l5.html.
2. Charles Phillips, May 4, 1970, 39 AMERICAN HISTORY 16, 18 (2004).

available at

3. Id. at 16.
4. Id. at 72.

5. Id.
6. May Fourth Task Force, Chapter 1: Student Protest in the 1960's, http://dept.kent.
edu/may3/CampusUnrest/Campus-Unrest chapterl a.htm.
7.

Jack Rosenthal, Nixon Panel Calls Hearingson Public on Campus Unrest, N.Y. TIMES, July

7, 1970, at 1, 29.
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nomination stalled in the Senate and withdrawn by the Nixon administration
when it took office. However, Matt remained a U.S. Attorney, staying on
after he had submitted his resignation in 1969. In so doing, he scored well
with Justice Department officials, so much so that he reportedly received
and turned down an offer for the top job in the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, which then channeled millions of dollars to police, courts,
and correctional institutions.8
The incidents at Kent State and Jackson State, along with student
discontent, brought a new opportunity for Matt. At a May meeting between
President Nixon and university presidents, the idea of a national commission
first materialized. After meeting with ABA leaders on May 13, 1970, the
President on June 13 appointed former Pennsylvania Governor William
Scranton to chair a Commission of nine, including one student and three
academic figures, to "identify the principal causes of campus violence," to
"assess the reasons for breakdown in the processes for orderly expression of
dissent," and to "suggest specific methods and procedures through which
legitimate grievances can be resolved." 9 President Nixon asked the
Commission to begin work "immediately" and report by October 1, 1970.10
Matt's official appointment as Executive Director of the President's
Commission on Campus Unrest is dated July 7, 1970, but he came to
Washington in June just after Scranton's appointment." Matt spoke with
Scranton, Lloyd Cutler, and others who had worked on President Johnson's
Violence Commission and networked around town. 12 He also spoke with
Justice Department friends from both the present and past administrations. 13
He learned that the Kerner Commission took nine months to complete its
report and the Violence Commission took almost twice as long.14
Having given up a trout fishing trip to Norway, Matt decided, after
assurances of cooperation and administrative support, to tackle the new job
and finish it quickly. The October 1 deadline was important, not only to
Matt, but to many of those he brought on who had to return to their work at
academic institutions when the school year began. And, indeed, the
Commission presented its basic report to the President on September 26,
1970, with special chapters on Kent State and Jackson State reported soon
thereafter. The entire document was published by the U.S. Government
8. Chiefof Campus Unrest Study: William Matthew Byrne, Jr., N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1970.
9. Richard Nixon, Statement on Establishing the President's Commission on Campus Unrest
(June 13, 1970), availableat http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2544&st=&stl =.
10. Id.
It. Interview with John Kirby (May 9, 2006).
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Many of the sources used throughout this article came from untitled documents in William
Matthew Byrne's personal files. This information came from an article in Matt's files containing his
handwritten edits entitled Inside the President's Commission on Campus Unrest [hereinafter Inside
the Commission] (on file with author).
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Printing Office under the title The Report of the President's Commission on
Campus Unrest. 5
At first, Matt was housed in Bud Wilkinson's office in the Executive
Office Building. Of this experience, Matt said:
I thought I was doing pretty well for a boy from California. Bud
came back and I suddenly realized that a President's Commission
has no office, no pencils, paper, furniture, secretaries, etc. You start
from scratch. It began to dawn on me I had none of these, a staff
of
16
no one but myself, and had 10 or 11 weeks to complete the job.
What went into this effort speaks volumes about Matt's character and
ability. It was perhaps the greatest test he ever faced with respect to his
organizational skills. At the end of the day, as a result of his efforts, the
Commission's staff included 147 full-time and part-time members. 17
The Commission held public hearings in Washington (five days) and
Los Angeles (two days). Following hundreds of witness interviews and a
study of the voluminous investigative reports relating to those incidents, the
Commission held three days of open hearings at Jackson State and three
days at Kent State in August. The Commission also sent investigative teams
to Lawrence, Kansas to examine town and gown relations, and to the
University of New Mexico, where they spoke with Mexican-American
students and examined the May incidents involving the National Guard.
Another team spent three days in Madison, Wisconsin following the
bombing of the Army Mathematics Center. A final pair of teams conducted
interviews on fourteen campuses from New York to Oregon, speaking with
students, faculty, administrators, and police officials about university crisis
management. 18
In late July, the Commission mailed questionnaires to university
administrators, student body presidents, and faculty chairpersons to
determine their past experiences with incidents of disruption. Of 2700
colleges and universities polled, about 68% responded.' 9
During late August and most of September, the Commission itself met
in a series of meetings to decide upon its report.

15.

THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CAMPUS UNREST (Amo Press 1970)

[hereinafter RPCCU].
16. From an untitled document in William Matthew Byrne's personal files [hereinafter WMB
files] (on file with author).
17.
18.
19.

RPCCU, supra note 15, at vi-viii.
WMB files (on file with author).
WMB files (on file with author).
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No titles were issued to the staff until most of the Commission's work
was completed.20 Upon reading the final report, I was surprised to find that
I had been given the title Special Assistant for Administration, even though I
spent much of my time on the Commission with Lt. John Konstanturas of
the Los Angeles Police Department
editing and reworking a chapter titled
21
"Law Enforcement Response."
Matt was the general and the ringmaster.22 He described himself as a
"short-order cook," handling problem after problem, dealing with those in
front of him, and forgetting the old ones as new ones came in the door.23
Everyone else just did what they were told to do, taking on their assigned
tasks. Matt put together his staff from a variety of quarters. Old friends
came from Los Angeles like Doug Dalton, who was later titled Director of
Investigations, NBC's Bob Abernathy, Los Angeles Police Department's
Deputy Chief Jim Fisk and John Konstanturas, Peter Blackman (dragooned
from L.A.'s O'Melveny & Myers), the FBI's Chuck Stine, his long-time
secretary, Ann Hope, and me (his former Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney).24
Matt also brought from the U.S. General Services Administration in
Washington Jim Arthur (Chief Administrative Officer).2 5 Arthur worked
wonders finding usable space and office equipment and helped put together
the administrative staff by begging and borrowing help from all over
Washington.
From academia, later to be Georgetown President Tim Healy joined the
Commission.
In addition, old friends who had been in the Justice
Department joined the Commission like John Kirby, who became the
Commission's Deputy Director and was a central figure in the investigative
efforts.26 Kirby recalled that a call from Attorney General John Mitchell to
a partner was able to release him from his duties at Mudge Rose in New
York (Mitchell's old law firm).2 7
Others Matt brought in included Bob Owen from the Department of
Justice who worked on the Jackson State investigation, as did Jack Bass of
The Charlotte Observer. Owen Fiss (formerly with the Civil Rights
Division of the Department of Justice) served on the editorial staff, as did
well known academics and authors such as Nathan Glazer and Kenneth
Keniston. Contributors included Seymour Martin Lipset, Ralph Salerno,
Fred M. Vinson, Jr., and James Q. Wilson. 8

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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Interview with John Kirby (May 9, 2006).
RPPCU, supra note 15, at 149-83.
Interview with John Kirby (May 9, 2006).
Inside the Commission, supra note 14, at 4.
For a list of the individuals involved in the Commission see RPPCU, supranote 15, at vii.
Id.
Id.
Interview with John Kirby (May 9,2006).
See RPPCU, supra note 15, at vii.
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Paul Weaver of "Public Interest" served as Chief Editor; he was assisted
by Paul Brest (later Dean of Stanford Law School), Erwin Glikes of Basic
Books, and John Labovitz of the University of Chicago. 9
Matt's charge to all was to turn out a quality product, stay out of the
political fray, and get it done by October 1, 1970. 3°
For the diverse group of people selected for the Commission gathered
together in Washington, it was a typical hot, humid summer. Most of those
who came into town took up short-term rentals. For the staff who worked
there regularly, the days were long; Paul Brest's best recollection of the
summer's work was that it was "intense. 31 I recall often working late into
the night, surviving on the pizza provided by the nearby pizza parlors.
For Matt, it was a seven day a week job (with one Sunday afternoon
off). 32 He recalled taking an extra suit and four shirts when he first went to
Washington in June.33 He didn't get back to Los Angeles for over six
weeks. Matt recalled that "even on that brief trip I barely had time to
replenish my wardrobe, which by then was sinking rapidly despite-or
perhaps because of-the vigorous services of the Farragut laundry. 34
Office social events were rare. Matt did, however, celebrate his fortieth
birthday that summer, an event that brought cake and liquid refreshment to
his Spartan office.
In many ways the Commission was like a three-ring circus-with
Commission meetings in and out of town, investigators reporting in from all
over the country, assignments being sent out to the researchers, and writers
collecting the background material that went into the drafting of the Report,
which began in earnest in mid-August. The staff wrote and rewrote the
Report several times and went through more than a dozen drafts. "
II.

THE PRODUCT

The final Report was not only about 1970s campus unrest, but about its
history. It spoke of its antecedents in the civil rights movement, the SDS
reorganization at Port Huron in 1962, the Berkeley revolt in 1964, and the

29. Id.
30. Interview with Peter Blackman (Apr. 27, 2006).
31. Interview with Paul Brest (Apr. 27, 2006).
32. Inside the Commission, supranote 14, at I.
33. From the personal files of William Matthew Byrne entitled The Rainy Day Oration (on file
with author).
34. Inside the Commission, supra note 14, at 1.

35. Id. at 2.

Columbia incident in 1968.36 For a flavor of the time, one turns to the 1970
report of Secretary of the Treasury Eugene Rossides, who wrote that over
8200 bombings, attempted bombings, and bomb threats could be attributed
to "campus disturbances and student unrest" between January 1, 1969, and
April 15, 1970." 7
At issue was not only the war in Vietnam, but the conditions of minority
groups. Jackson State brought the plight of the black student movement
front and center. In 1970, Jackson State's student body of 4300 was made
up of 4295 black students. 38 The Commission devoted a chapter to the black
student movement, describing "a depth of bitterness among black students at
black institutions that surpassed anything found among white students. 39
For black students, the bitterness was not so much about the war, but about
white racism, pervasive discrimination, and segregation.4 °
In describing the status of black students in higher education, the
Commission reported that it "adds up to one of the most glaring inequities of
American life: an inequality of quantity as well as an inequality of
quality."' 4
The plight of black students in higher education led the
Commission to recommend greatly increasing financial aid to black colleges
and universities, supporting "efforts of formerly all-white universities to
recruit Black, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican and other minority
students," and making available "adequate government-sponsored student
aid" to these students.42
The Commission's Report walked a fine line, strongly condemning
violence, calling for swift removal, and urging vigorous prosecution of those
responsible from university campuses, yet placing a high value on 4dissent
3
and peaceful protest as part of "this nation's way of governing itself."
In effect, the Commission said 'cool the rhetoric.'" The Commission
noted that "[h]arsh and bitter rhetoric can
set citizen against citizen,
45
exacerbate tension, and encourage violence.,
Vice President Spiro Agnew, noted for his alliterative rhetoric, referred
to the Report while speaking at a Republican luncheon in Sioux Falls, South
Dakota. He called the Report a "pablum for the permissivists. ' ' 46 Itwas an

36. See RPCCU, supra note 15, at 22-38 (discussing the background of student protests in the

1960s).
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 412.

39. Id. at 94.
40. Id.at 103.
41. Id. at 107 (noting that although black youth have a desire to attend college, the end result is
not equality with whites, but rather further "disprivilege and disparity").
42. Id.at lI.
43. Id. at 7.
44. See id.at 10.
45. Id.
46. Press Release, Address by the Vice President, South Dakota Republican Luncheon, Sioux

298

[Vol. 34: 293, 2007]

A Tribute to Matt Byrne
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

off-year election and Agnew, having just campaigned in ten states, offered
this analysis of the forthcoming election: "Will the radical liberalism that
controls the Senate of the United States prevail in the nation-or will
America be led into the future by moderates, centrists
and conservatives who
47
States?
United
the
of
President
the
behind
stand
What brought about Agnew's flash response was the first series of
recommendations directed to the President. Among these recommendations,
the Commission urged the President to exercise "his reconciling moral
leadership" to take the lead in explaining the causes of campus unrest, and to
articulate those values Americans hold in common, while pointing out the
"importance of diversity and coexistence to the nation's health. 48
"[N]othing is more important," said the Commission, "than an end to the
war in Indochina., 49 The reaction of disaffected students to the Cambodian
invasion "was a measure of the intensity of their moral recoil." 5 °
The Commission's recommendations were directed not only to the
President, but to government, law enforcement, universities, and students.
Agnew's quick response appears to have been a reaction to press accounts
that keyed into the Commission's recommendations regarding the President,
who at the time of the Report's release was preparing to leave for Europe.
In response to Agnew's comments, columnist Roscoe Drummond wrote that
he did "not know anyone who has read the report who believes that such
statements can be justified by what it says."'" He attributed Agnew's
remarks to a misreading of the President.5 2 He concluded his column:
"[W]hen the Vice-President begins to enunciate government policy before
the President has established it, something will have to be done to see it
doesn't happen again." 3
A.

For Government

The recommendations were also directed to the government generally.
The Commission urged federal, state, and local officials to "be sensitive to
the charge of repression and to fashion their words and deeds in a manner

Falls, South Dakota, Sept. 29, 1970.
47. Id.
48. RPCCU, supra note 15, at 8, 9.
49. Id.at 9.
50. Id.
51. Roscoe Drummond, Agnew exceeds his mandate, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 24,
1970, at 24.

52. Id.
53. Id.
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designed to refute it."54 The recommendations called upon these officials
for cooperation in handling campus disorders and precise guidelines as to
when and where they would be justified in ordering the National Guard to
intervene.55 The Commission urged that public officials "reject demands
that entire universities be punished because of the ideas or excesses of some
members 5 6and honor their responsibility to help preserve academic
freedom.,
In light of the attacks on campus ROTC programs, the Commission
recommended that the Department of Defense "establish alternatives to
ROTC so that officer education is available to students whose universities
choose to terminate on-campus ROTC programs. 57
Further, because of the danger it saw connected to bombings and arson
on campus, the Commission urged enactment of "strict controls over the
sale, transfer, and possession of explosive materials." 58
B. ForLaw Enforcement
After expressing sympathy for peace officers who must deal with "all
types of campus disorder," the Commission noted "sometimes fatal
instances of unnecessary harshness and illegal violence by law enforcement
officers." 5 9 The Commission recommended "the development of joint
contingency plans among law enforcement agencies," with shoulder
weapons employed only
"as emergency equipment in the face of sniper fire
60
or armed resistance.,
Most notably, the Commission singled out the National Guard, calling
for more Guard training in controlling civil disturbances. 61 The Commission
noted that the National Guard had "been called [out] to intervene in civil
disorders at home more than 200 times" in the previous three years.62 The
Commission recommended that the Guard have "nonlethal weaponry so that
it [would] use deadly force only as the absolute last resort., 6 3 In its chapter
on Law Enforcement response, the Commission concluded that "[t]he Guard
rather than
should generally be deployed in a manner that supplements
64
supplants the efforts of local and state police agencies."

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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RPCCU, supra note 15, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1I.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 180.
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At Kent State, the Guardsmen were armed with M-1 rifles, high velocity
weapons with a range of almost two miles.6 5 Sixty-one shots were fired by
twenty-eight guardsmen-without an order to fire-leaving four dead.66
The breakdown in control by the Guard at Kent State and by police
officers and the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol at Jackson State, as
described in the Commission's special reports, led it to conclude that "too
frequently, local police forces have been undermanned, improperly
equipped, poorly trained and unprepared for campus disturbances. ' 67 On the
other hand, the Commission noted in its chapter on the subject, in 1970,
police responded to68 mass student demonstrations with "professional skill" in
hundreds of cities.
The chapter sets forth for law enforcement a summary of detailed
responses to campus disorders, a virtual what-to-do guide based on the best
thinking available at the time.69
C. For the University
Universities were not spared by the Report: "Recent history has made it
only too clear that the failure of the university to pursue effectively its stated
70
goals, let alone to live up to them, has also contributed to student unrest.
The Commission's broad recommendations ranged from defining the
university as an open forum with speech as broad as that protected by the
First Amendment, to a conclusion that faculty members who engage in or
lead disruptive conduct have no place in the university community. 7' The
Commission argued that "universities as institutions must remain politically
neutral" except where "their own integrity, educational purpose, or
preservation, is at stake. 72
Federal defense projects on campus had been under attack. While
observing that much of that type of research had academic merit, the
Commission recommended that universities "avoid acceptance of new
classified projects and terminate existing classified projects unless it is clear

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.at 289.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.at 182.
Id.
Id. at 185.
id.at 13.
Id.at 14.

that the undesirable results of undertaking such a project are outweighed by
compelling advantages. 73
D. For Students
The Commission noted that "[t]oo many students have acted
irresponsibly and even dangerously in pursuing their stated goals and
expressing their dissent," 74 and called for the removal of perpetrators of
violence. 75
Short on specifics, the Commission said that students "should be
reminded that language that offends will seldom persuade" and that "giving
moral support to those who are planning violent action is morally
despicable. 76
The Commission called for patience: "The fight for change and justice is
the good fight; to drop out or strike out at the first sign of failure is to insure
that change will never come. 7 7
III. COMMISSION TENSIONS

Preparation of the Report was not without tension, conflict, and
differences of opinion. Joseph Rhodes, a Harvard Junior Fellow and the
only student on the Commission, called Matt from Boston on July 27, 1970,
and complained that the Commission wasn't going to hold hearings in
Lawrence, Kansas.7" Rhodes had told people in Lawrence that he would be
advocating for such a hearing. 79 He was also upset that there were not more
black staff members and wanted a Commission meeting that week. 80 No
hearing ended up being held in Lawrence.
In describing his staff, Matt described several of its noted members, its
"many brilliant lawyers," "outstanding editors and social scientists," not to
mention a "Vassar-trained panther-symp. and scores of White House
spies. ' 81 Outside of the known and trusted staff, one had to be careful what
one said.
With such a diverse staff, there were several intellectual and editing
disputes that couldn't be avoided. For example, a draft that had been

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
1970)
79.
80.
81.
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Id. at 195.
Id.at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
From the personal files of William Matthew Byrne, Memorandum of Conversation (July 27,
(on file with author).
Id.
Id.
Inside the Commission, supra note 14, at 2.
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prepared dealing with unrest in Lawrence, Kansas ended up on the cutting
room floor-not a happy event for its drafters.
Similarly, Jack Bass of the Charlotte Observer complained that "the
purging of all mention of Orangeburg in a major report of the federal
government must appear to sensitive blacks as one more example of the
point that Tom Wicker makes in the [New York Times column]. ' 82 Wicker
had opined that the prevailing feeling was that it was blacks who were killed
and that it wasn't that important.83

On or about September 25, 1970, Matt and Governor Scranton took
some of their remaining staff over to the White House to present the Report,

adopted unanimously by the Commission, to the President. John Kirby
recalled that photographs were taken and that Governor Scranton and the
President met privately. 84 The President left soon thereafter on his European
85
trip, and on September 26, 1970, the Report was issued publicly.
According to John Kirby, the White House never released the photos with
the President.86
The press reaction was a story in itself. When Vice President Agnew
gave his "pablum of permissivists" speech, he noted that there were "two
reports, the real one and the cosmetized one... the one purveyed by press

and TV to America" for which "we can thank the self-appointed interpreters
and translators on the Commission, and within the Nation's 'academic-

journalistic
complex,' who rushed before the cameras to tell us what it
87
said."9

The press reaction was largely positive.

The following article titles

from major newspapers typify the contemporary journalistic response to the

82. Letter from Jack Bass, Charlotte Observer, to Matthew Byrne, Staff Director, President's
Commission on Campus Unrest (Oct. 5, 1970) (on file with author). Orangeburg is mentioned
briefly in the Commission Report in a quotation from a statement coming from the president,
faculty, and students of a predominately black Southern university. See RPCCU, supra note 15, at
97-98. The authors of the statement used the killings of three student protesters in Orangeburg,
South Carolina as an example of the "systemic repression of Black people" occurring at the time.
See id. at 98; see also BrainyHistory, Officers Kill Three Students Demonstrating in South Carolina
State, http://www.brainyhistory.com/events/1968/february-8-1968_134434.html (last visited Oct.
11,2006).
83. Tom Wicker, Jackson State and Orangeburg,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1970.
84. Interview with John Kirby (May 9, 2006). In addition, Matt's files do not contain any
Commission-related photos with President Nixon.
85. Richard Nixon, Letter to the Chairman, President's Commission on Campus Unrest, on the
Commission's Report (December 12, 1970), availableat http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=2844.
86. Interview with John Kirby (May 9, 2006).
87. See supra note 46.
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Sound Advice; 88 The Blame Distributed;89 Sound
Toward Reconciliation;91 and What the Scranton
Said.92
One commentator called the Report an
... to the request the President made," noting that "[i]t
did the exceptional thing: it tried to answer the President's questions, and it
did its work with a rare degree of seriousness and maturity. '
But there were differing voices: "The scattergun charges of the President's
Commission were not necessarily a reasoned analysis of events leading to
the shootings at Kent State ....Instead, the commission report recognized
the varied opinions of its members, conceded that the commission would
never achieve unanimity and incorporated all views in its conclusions. 94
Another disapproving commentator wrote:
Report: Calm and
Practical Advice; 90
Commission Really
"admirable response

There is widespread and thoroughly justified criticism of the .. .
Commission which has made our city and state a prime target for its
biased and arbitrary conclusion. . . . Public indignation is increased,
not lessened by the . . .Report, just as public sentiment more
strongly supports the forces of law and order which this prejudiced
report apparently seeks to hamstring and discredit. 9
President Nixon did not speak publicly about the Report until December
10, 1970, when he wrote a nine page single spaced "Dear Bill" letter to
Governor Scranton, thanking him and the "Commission and its staff for the
considerable time and energy [they] invested in this task., 96 The letter
conveyed the President's agreement with many of the Commission's
findings: the "rejection of the use of violence as a means of effecting
change--on or off campus"; 97 "[t]he call for tolerance.., for the rights and
feelings of one another"; 98 and that "university reform [is] properly the
concern of the campus community," including the role of controlling
disorder. 99 President Nixon expressed thanks for the Commission's support

88.

Calm and Sound Advice, LONG BEACH PRESS TELEGRAM, Oct. 2, 1970.

89.

The Blame Distributed,GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct. 6, 1970.

90. Sound PracticalAdvice, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 29, 1970.
91. Toward Reconciliation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1970.
92. What The Scranton Commission Really Said, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1970, at D6.
93. Id.
94. Lack of Objectivity Plagues Probesof Campus Violence, SAN DIEGO TRIB., Oct. 20, 1970.
95. The President's Commission On Campus Violence Makes a Report, CLARION-LEDGER
(Jackson, Miss.), Oct. 9, 1970, at 14.
96. President Richard Nixon, Letter to the Chairman, President's Commission on Campus
Unrest, on the Commission's Report T 2 (Dec. 10, 1970) [hereinafter Nixon Letter],
http://www.nixonfoundation.org/clientuploads/directory/archive/l970_pdffiles/1 970_0458.pdf.
97. Id. 5.
98. Id. 17 (quoting unknown source).
99. Id. 23-24.
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of the student aid provisions which he had proposed," 0 and noted that he
had called upon the Cabinet to review the recommendations pertaining to
their jurisdiction. '
President Nixon used the letter to defend his Presidency. With respect
to those recommendations pertaining to the Presidency, he spoke directly of
his efforts to diminish "America's involvement in the Asian war" and "to
end that war in a way that will justify the sacrifices of this generation of
young Americans .... ,,02
President Nixon noted that moral authority in the country does not
reside in the Presidency alone: "There are thousands upon thousands of
individuals-clergy, teachers, public officials, scholars, writers-to whom
segments of the nation look for moral, intellectual and political
leadership." 0 3 Nixon noted that "[r]esponsibility for maintaining a peaceful
and open climate for learning in an academic community does not rest with
the Federal Government . . . it rests squarely with the members of that
academic community themselves."' 4
The letter speaks of leaders of the national community who "have
spoken or acted with forthrightness and courage, on and off the campus,
unequivocally condemning violence and disruption as instruments of change
and reaffirming the principles upon which continuance of a free society
depends."'0 5 "High in that category I would place the Vice President ...
,106 It was the only reference to Vice President Agnew in the letter.
He concluded by stating: "The work of the Commission has expanded
our understanding of what has been happening . . . necessary public and
political discussion of the7 issue will surely continue-and indeed be
advanced by your report."

10

In an undated statement found in his files, Matt reported: (1) "over
seventy-five percent of the newspapers around the Country, have editorially
praised the report"; (2) numerous universities have said they are "preparing
new disciplinary procedures setting forth permissible conduct on the

100. The provisions formed the proposed Higher Education Opportunity Act of 1970. See id.
33. For more on the Act, see generally President Richard Nixon, Special Message to Congress on
Higher Education (Mar. 19, 1970), availableat http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?
pid=2915.
101. Nixon Letter, supra note 96, at 35.
102. Id. 39.
103. Id. 45.
104. Id. 7.
105. Id. 46.
106. Id. 47.
107. Id. 49.
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campuses, and making appropriate plans to cope with 'impermissible
conduct"'; (3) there are many courses offered at universities around the
country based on the Report; (4) "[Department of Health Education and
Welfare] has suggested special funding for black colleges that are sorely in
need of federal aid"; and (4) Secretary Laird has said that the National Guard
will now be equipped with non-lethal weapons. 08 Matt also reported that
"the Pentagon is now buying 120,000 additional Flak Vests, and 140,000
face masks." 109
Matt reported, however, that in Mississippi "nothing's been done.""
There was no inclination to change policies that allowed state police to take
inappropriate weapons onto college campuses. Further, there was no
willingness to vary the composition of the state police force, which had no
black patrolmen, or the National Guard, which had only twenty-one black
members.'
The L.A. Times reported Matt as saying that "[t]he
U.S.
12
Government should not be funding the Mississippi National Guard." 1
Matt also expressed unhappiness about the public portrait drawn of the
Report:
The actual report bears very little resemblance to what I will call the
reputed report-by which I really mean the impression of the report
which was created by the mass media and by politicians, book
reviewers, and other pubic spokesmen. This reputed report, if I may
make a composite portrait of it, is a rather short and apocalyptic
document. It declares that campus unrest is the most serious public
problem ever to face the nation. It asserts that the [sic] President
Nixon, and especially President Nixon's rhetoric, are the principal
cause of campus unrest and that only the President, by articulating
unifying ideals and offering a healing and reconciling rhetoric, can
put an end to campus unrest. In general, the reputed report says
very little about students, faculty, administrators, and what little it
does say is permissive and approving. It does take note of a youth
culture which is emerging among some of our universities, but it
does so in a way that endorses this culture and its perceptions of
American society and the world. The reputed report also muddles
everything, deliberately laying blame on everyone and thereby
evading all the tough questions and deep issues. It condemns the
police and national guard for using deadly force against students at
Jackson State and Kent State and thus implies that law enforcement

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

WMB Files (on file with author).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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officers should do nothing in the face of student riot, disruption, and
violence. What's more, this reputed report doesn't say anything
that everyone didn't already know. It's useless and it's mindless.
In every respect,-I repeat, in eve
respect-this portrait of the
report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest is
absolutely wrong. I won't go into the specifics because I promised
you I wouldn't summarize the report. But we did not say the
President was a cause of campus unrest; we did not say that
Presidential leadership can or should end campus unrest; we took
extensive note of students, faculty, and administrators, their roles in
campus unrest, and their great responsibilities in responding to it; in
no way did we endorse the new youth culture or condemn American
society in general. We did not lay blame on people; instead, we
attempted to distinguish between "cause" and "fault" just as we also
attempted to distinguish between "fault" and "responsibility."
Police officers, for example, are not at fault for the existence of
crime; yet it is their responsibility to deal with crime and with
criminals. Far from trying to evade the tough issues, the report
made a special effort to meet them head-on. It is true that these
issues did not seem to yield clear-cut, one-sentence answers and
solutions. Really tough questions and problems rarely do, and when
they do not, that is hardly the fault of the report that seeks to
analyze and understand them. The report is not soft on students;
neither does it deal harshly or unsympathetically with law
enforcement, and neither does it suggest that police and national
guard at Jackson, Kent, or elsewhere should do nothing in the face
of student riots, disruptions, or violence. Finally, the report brings
new data to light and offers new analysis of what we already know
about campus unrest. Or at least it attempts to do these things.
How well it succeeded is something I can't speak to without
prejudice.
Why did the mass media, the politicians, and the public pundits
manage to do such a shamefully inadequate job of describing the
report to the public at large? This is a big and difficult question to
answer, but I believe that the outlines of the answer are not too hard
to find.

Throughout the summer, it was easy to see a vicious cycle at work.
At first through its hearings and later in its report, the Commission
offered a prominent public platform. Especially in an election year,
a prominent platform draws advocates the way truffles draw hogs.
The platform was created in the first place-presumably-in order
to find facts, ascertain causes, and suggest practical and reasonable
courses of remedial action, both public and private, insofar as
remedies existed and seemed advisable.
Yet because the subject being analyzed was partly political in its
character, there was a chance that analysis would be subverted and
displaced by advocacy. And because the subject was an important
one which had figured with increasing prominence in the mass
media, whatever got said in hearings, or about hearings, or in the
report, or about the report, was guaranteed to receive prominent
coverage in the mass media. The more extreme, or dramatic, or
colorful the statement; the more political the statement; the more
hostile or divisive the statement, the more likely it was to receive
prominent coverage.
I do not necessarily mean to blame the mass media. Their job is to
report what people who are important say and do on subjects that
are important. The more important or dramatic the person, the
statement, the action, or the subject, the more prominently the
media will report it. That is as it must be in a nation which hopes to
be democratic. But we discovered that mass media that operate in
this way are not without their disadvantages.
Briefly, in outline:
1. People were trying to use the platform of the Commission as a
place to make propaganda: student witnesses, Commissioners, etc.
2. From the very beginning, there was the Rhodes-Agnew spat,
which defined the one issue around which all subsequent media
coverage and most public discossion [sic] centered: would the
Commission blame the President, thereby biting the hand that
created it? This is a political question, and really a question only of
propaganda; it is also a dramatic story, regardless of propaganda, if
it happened.
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3. Media were constantly emphasizing the question of whose
propaganda would dominate the commission.
4. The report tried-by and large successfully-to rise above such
propagandistic bickering; yet despite its success in doing so, the
media and the politicians and commentators in general insisted on
discussing the report only in terms of the political-propaganda
categories.
5. Result: the report, in the form that it reaches the overwhelming
majority of Americans, failed to educate them because the system of
public discussion-politicians, public speakers, and mass mediadistorted the report. Rather, they ignored the report. They
discussed the report using the preexisting, propagandistic ideas and
concepts which the report rejected. That made it impossible for the
report to change those ideas and concepts-anything the report said
that wasn't in line with the existing rhetoric on campus unrest (ie,
with existing propaganda) was ignored, or treated as if it were in
line with propaganda.
7. [sic] What we have here, then, is an object lesson in the limits of
public discussion in a democracy and in the capacity of public
discussion to improve itself. This is not a new lesson: similar
reports-eg, Moynihan report on Negro family-have been
similarly assimilated to pre-existing propaganda categories even
though the intention and substance of the report was to show how
these categories were inadequate.
8. If there is any solution-and basically there isn't one-but to the
extent that there can be a solution to this failure of public discussion
communication, it is to be found in improving the minds and sense
of responsibility of the men, or at least the statements, who have
acceess [sic] to the mass media; and in restricting the amount of
information the mass media pretend to carry. This, of course, is the
unending struggle of any decent political system, democratic or
otherwise. It is one that must be taken seriously. Things are
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complicated today, changing fast; the consequences of mistakes and
of misunderstanding seem greater than ever before." 3
The Commission closed its doors on October 30, 1970, under budget.
On November 3, 1970, elections were held nationwide. The Democratic
Senate majority was retained 54-44, a net gain of 2 for Republicans. 114 In
the House, Democrats strengthened their existing majority with a net gain of
12 seats, giving them a 255-180 advantage. 115 Democrats scored their
biggest gain in gubernatorial races, reversing control of state houses from 32
Republicans and 18 Democrats to 29 Democrats and 21 Republicans. The
Republican Senatorial and Congressional candidates for whom Vice
President Agnew had campaigned in South Dakota lost. 116
Six months after the Report was issued, concerns were expressed about
the calm that appeared to be present on college campuses. Alexander Heard,
Chancellor at Vanderbilt University and a special campus advisor to
President Nixon, said, "While the temperature has been lower . . . the

thermometer does not register the state of mind of students around the
country.""' 7 Heard said that there had been reports from a number of
campuses indicating that students were withdrawing into themselves and
into their own small personal groups. 118 Sol Libowitz, Chairman of the
American Council on Education Commission on Campus Unrest, said,
"With all the problems the nation has, a campus which is not troubled today
is not worth its salt."'' 19

After finishing his work on the Commission, Matt returned to Los
Angeles and was appointed a U.S. District Court judge in 1971. He served
effectively there until his death on January 12, 2006.
As one who worked with him closely while he was U.S. Attorney and
on the Commission, and remained his friend to his death, I have often
wondered how different his ultimate path could have been. Looking through
his files I found notes of an effort to get him appointed L.A. County District
Attorney in late 1970 (after then District Attorney Evelle Younger was
elected Attorney General).
However, a member of the Board of
Supervisors-the appointing authority-killed the idea because he didn't

113. Inside the Commission, supra note 14, at 5-10.
114. See Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, Statistics of the Congressional
Election of November 3, 1970, at 42 (1971), available at http://clerk.house.gov/members/
electionlnfo? 1970election.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Nov. 3 Results: A Mixed Bag for the 2 Parties,CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Nov. 6, 1970,
at 2743.
117. Bryce Nelson, College Unrest Still Festering, Advisors Say, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1971, at
A21.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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like Matt's prosecution of a friend in the Friars Club card cheating case. 0
Had Matt become District Attorney, I have little doubt that he would have
succeeded there, using his personal and administrative skills to transform
that office. And with his success there I have no doubt that he could have
run for California Attorney General in 1978 and won. He would have been
good there as well.
But his career took a different turn. He left behind a good public life,
well lived, with friends everywhere, friends who love to tell Matt Byrne
stories with fondness and admiration.

120. See U.S. v. Roselli, 432 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 1970).
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